A distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack can flood a victim site with malicious traffic, causing service disruption or even complete failure. Public-access sites like amazon or ebay are particularly vulnerable to such attacks, because they have no way of a priori blocking unauthorized traffic.
Introduction
Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks are recognized as one of the most dangerous threats to Internet operation. An attacker typically uses self-propagating code to compromise a large number of vulnerable hosts and commands them to flood the victim with malicious traffic. Any organization or enterprise that is dependent on the Internet can be subjected to such an attack, causing its service to be severely disrupted, if not fail completely.
Current responses to DDoS attacks usually involve manual "hop-by-hop" filter propagation that stops at arbitrary points in the network: Typically, the operator of a site under attack identifies the nature of attack traffic and installs filters in the site's firewall to block this traffic. Then she contacts her ISP and has the ISP install comparable filters in its routers in order to protect the tail circuit to the site. The ISP may contact the next provider upstream and so on.
The first two problems with the current approach have been identified and addressed in the literature: First, the current approach is manual and, hence, too slow to keep up with a sophisticated attack. Mahajan et al. have proposed Pushback, a mechanism that automates filter propagation: A site under attack sends a request to its edge-router to block (or rate-control) attack traffic. The edge-router satisfies the request and may as well identify the upstream routers that contribute most attack traffic and propagate similar requests to them [14] . Second, the current approach is ineffective in the face of source address spoofing. I.e., an attack source can spoof multiple IP addresses and use them to attack the victim site. In that case, there is practically no way for the victim site to distinguish attack traffic from "good" traffic. Thus, blocking (or rate-controlling) attack traffic by source IP address leads to sacrificing most good traffic as well. To address this, researchers have proposed anti-spoofing mechanisms that provide each packet with a non-spoofable identifier [9, 17] . These identifiers can be used by the victim site to identify and selectively block attack traffic.
In this paper, we identify and address a new challenge in protecting public-access sites against DDoS attacks: Blocking attack traffic using a number of filters per router that can be accommodated in today's routers, i.e., efficiently managing the "filtering capacity" of the Internet during a DDoS attack.
Each hardware router has only a limited number of filters that can block traffic without degrading the router's performance (wire-speed filters). The limitation comes from cost and space: Wire-speed filters are typically stored in TCAM (Ternary Content Addressable Memory), which they share with the router's forwarding table. Some of the largest TCAM chips available today accommodate 256K entries [4] and cost about $200 [1] . A sophisticated router linecard fits at most 1 TCAM chip [6] i.e., at most 256K filters per network interface.
On the other hand, self-propagating code can compromise 1 million hosts [16] and synchronize them to attack a certain victim. The victim may use packet marking to identify 1M attack flows, and automatic filter propagation to send out 1M filtering requests to block these flows. However, all these requests must be propagated through the victim's edge-router and the Internet core. 1M filters is too high a load for any edge-router. Moreover, 1M filters per potential victim is too high a load for the Internet core.
Yet, there are enough filtering resources in the Internet to block such large-scale attacks. For example, an attack coming from 100K different networks involves at least 100K routers, i.e., about 25 billion filters are available to help block attack traffic. Clearly, the closer we get to the attack sources, the larger the amount of filtering resources available per attack source; it is the victim's edgerouter and the Internet core that are the "filtering bottleneck". Therefore, our solution focuses on causing attack traffic to be blocked as close as possible to its sources, while requiring a reasonable number of filters from each participating (edge or core) router.
In this paper, we present AITF (Active Internet Traffic Filtering), a mechanism that protects public-access sites against highly distributed denial-of-service attacks. AITF requires a bounded amount of resources from each participating router, on the order of a few thousand entries of TCAM memory and a few gigabytes of DRAM memory -we choose these requirements based on real products [2, 6] . AITF is incrementally deployable, because it offers substantial benefit even to the first sites that deploy it.
AITF assumes that there exists some anti-spoofing mechanism, which limits source address spoofing to a certain degree. The accuracy of the anti-spoofing mechanism affects AITF's power. However, it does not affect AITF's resistance to malicious abuse. I.e., AITF prevents, with high probability, a malicious node from forging filtering requests that would interrupt other nodes' communications; this probability is independent from the underlying anti-spoofing mechanism.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes our assumptions and section 3 describes the protocol in detail. Section 4 presents performance estimates and section 5 discusses Internet deployment. Section 6 presents simulation results. Sections 7 and 8 discuss vulnerability issues and related work, and section 9 concludes.
Assumptions

Limited Source Address Spoofing
We do not assume that source address spoofing is 100% eliminated; we assume the existence of some antispoofing mechanism, which limits source address spoofing to a certain degree. However, we define a minimal anti-spoofing requirement, which is necessary for AITF to operate: Any end-host or router can inspect a packet and identify, at wire-speed, and with high probability, a border router that forwarded the packet and is located close to its source. Clearly, the current Internet architecture does not meet our minimal requirement. However, a lot of research effort has been invested in designing deployable mechanisms that do: Park et al. have proposed Distributed Packet Filtering (DPF), where each participating router inspects the traffic that arrives at each interface and drops all packets with detectably fake IP source addresses [15] . Hamadeh et al. have proposed a packet marking scheme, where each packet is "stamped" by the first participating border router that forwards the packet [9] . Yaar et al. have proposed Path Identifier (Pi), where each participating router marks the forwarded packets, so that each packet obtains a "fingerprint" that reflects the entire path followed by the packet [17] . Each of these mechanisms either meets our minimal requirement or can be slightly modified to do so.
As we will see, this minimal requirement is enough for AITF to mitigate large DDoS attacks. However, AITF's power increases, if the underlying anti-spoofing mechanism provides (i) higher accuracy in identifying the sources of attack traffic, and (ii) more complete information about the path followed by attack traffic.
Detection and Identification of Attack Traffic
We assume that a public-access site can detect when it is under attack. We also assume that, using an anti-spoofing mechanism, the site can identify the set of traffic flows that contribute most to the attack and describe each one of them with an appropriate flow label. The format of the flow label depends on the anti-spoofing mechanism. For example, for DPF, it is simply an {IP destination prefix, IP source prefix} pair; for Pi, it is an {IP destination prefix, 16-bit path identifier} pair.
If an edge-network that hosts an attack source prevents its clients from spoofing, the traffic sent by the attack source can be specified and blocked by the victim as an individual flow. However, if the attack source is allowed to spoof multiple addresses, its traffic can only be specified and blocked by the victim as an aggregate of traffic forwarded by the same border router. Therefore, an edgenetwork that hosts attack sources and allows local spoofing will suffer coarser-grained filtering of its traffic.
Protocol Description
Overview
Upon determining that it is under attack, the victim sends a filtering request to its gateway. The victim's gateway temporarily blocks attack traffic and identifies a border router located close to the attacker -call it the attacker's gateway. The victim's gateway initiates a "counterconnection setup" with the attacker's gateway, i.e., an agreement not to transmit certain packets -the same way a TCP connection setup is an agreement to exchange packets. If the attacker's gateway does not respond or does not respect the agreement, the mechanism escalates to the second round.
In the second round, the victim's gateway blocks all traffic forwarded by the attacker's gateway to the victim. It does that (i) either by blocking the traffic locally, or (ii) by contacting another border router close to the attacker. Escalation can continue until a router along the attack path responds and a "counter-connection setup" is completed. If no router responds, attack traffic is blocked locally by the victim's gateway. However, as we will see, AITF both assists and motivates routers close to the attacker to help block attack traffic.
Note that our minimal requirement allows only for one escalation round, because the victim's gateway can identify only one border router located close to the attacker.
AITF Messages and Parameters
An AITF message includes the following fields:
• The flow labels field specifies a set of undesired traffic flows that the sender wants blocked.
• The SYN field and the ACK field are 1-bit flags.
• The nonce field is a random number.
Borrowing from TCP terminology, we use the terms "SYN message", "ACK message" and "SYN/ACK message" to refer to an AITF message with just the SYN flag set, just the ACK flag set, or both flags set, respectively.
There are 2 AITF parameters:
• The temporary filter timeout T tmp .
• The filtering window T .
Incremental Algorithm Description
Terminology
A filtering request is a request to block an undesired flow described by a specific flow label. An AITF message may include more than one filtering requests. An AITF router is a router that runs the AITF algorithm. We define the following terms with respect to an undesired traffic flow:
• The attacker is the source of the undesired flow.
• The victim is the detonation of the undesired flow.
• The attack path consists of the attacker, the set of AITF routers the undesired flow goes through, and the victim.
• The attacker's gateway is the AITF router closest to the attacker along the attack path.
• The victim's gateway is the AITF router closest to the victim along the attack path.
Basic Algorithm
1. The victim sends a filtering request to the victim's gateway, specifying an undesired flow F .
The victim's gateway (vGw):
(a) If the victim has exceeded a configured maximum filtering request rate R, the victim's gateway drops the message. Else:
(b) Installs a temporary filter to block F for T tmp time units and updates the victim's filtering request rate.
(c) Initiates and completes a 3-way handshake with the attacker's gateway.
The attacker's gateway (aGw):
(a) Responds to the 3-way handshake.
(b) Upon completion of the 3-way handshake, installs a filter to block F for T tmp time units.
(c) Sends a filtering request to the attacker, specifying F as the undesired flow.
4. The attacker stops F for T ≫ T tmp time units or risks being disconnected by its gateway aGw.
The victim's gateway installs a filter only temporarily, in order to immediately protect the victim until the attacker's gateway takes responsibility. Similarly, the attacker's gateway installs a filter temporarily, in order to immediately block the undesired flow until the attacker stops. As we will see, spending a filter for T tmp time units in order to block an undesired flow for T ≫ T tmp units is a key feature that enables AITF to block large attacks with a reasonable number of filters per router.
The 3-way Handshake
The handshake involves the following messages:
1. The victim's gateway sends a SYN message to the attacker's gateway.
2. The attacker's gateway responds with a SYN/ACK message addressed to the victim.
The victim's gateway intercepts the SYN/ACK and responds with an ACK.
The handshake prevents a malicious router M from causing a filter to be installed at router aGw and block traffic to V without V 's cooperation: When aGw receives an AITF SYN that requests to block traffic to V , aGw responds with a SYN/ACK that includes a nonce and is addressed to V . Malicious router M cannot snoop that SYN/ACK, unless it is located on the path between aGw and V . M must send an ACK with the correct nonce value, otherwise its request is rejected. By picking a sufficiently large and properly random value for the nonce, it can be made arbitrarily difficult for M to guess the nonce.
The 3-way handshake does open the door to certain abuses. We discuss them in section 7.2.
Shadow Filtering Table
In the basic algorithm, the attacker's gateway installs a filter and blocks the undesired flow F for T tmp time units, but expects the attacker to stop sending F for T ≫ T tmp time units. A smart attacker can play an "on-off" game: pretend to cooperate, pause F and resume it as soon as the attacker's gateway removes its temporary filter.
To address this case, the attacker's gateway records a shadow of the temporary filter in DRAM for T time units. If the attacker's gateway receives a second filtering request for F before the shadow filter expires, the attacker's gateway installs a temporary filter as before. This time, however, if the filter catches F traffic, the attacker's gateway disconnects the attacker.
The same technique is applied by the victim's gateway to verify that the attacker's gateway respects their filtering agreement, i.e., keeps the undesired flow blocked.
Note that an AITF router must "remember" a flow for as long as the flow must be filtered. That is, AITF does not reduce the amount of state required for filtering, it simply "moves" it from TCAM to DRAM. This makes filtering cheaper, given that DRAM costs about $0.5/MB, while TCAM costs about $200/MB.
Escalation
In the basic algorithm, an undesired flow is blocked only when the attacker's gateway cooperates. It is possible that the attacker's gateway either does not respond at all to the 3-way handshake or responds and then fails to keep the undesired flow blocked.
If the attacker's gateway does not respond to the 3-way handshake within a given grace period, the mechanism escalates to the next round.
If the attacker's gateway does respond, but fails to block the undesired flow for T time units:
1. The victim's gateway re-initiates the 3-way handshake.
2. If the undesired flow still does not stop, the mechanism escalates to the next round.
Step 1 gives a second chance to the attacker's gateway to block the undesired flow, in case the attacker is playing the on-off game described in section 3.3.4. When the mechanism escalates, the attacker's gateway is viewed as an attacker i.e., all traffic forwarded by the attacker's gateway to the victim is now considered an attack flow that must be blocked. So, every time the mechanism escalates, filtering becomes more aggressive. Escalation involves two potential actions:
1. The victim's gateway blocks all traffic from the attacker's gateway to the victim locally. Or:
2. The victim's gateway initiates a 3-way handshake with the AITF located closest to the attacker's gateway on the attack path.
If the victim's gateway has the necessary filtering resources to filter the attacker's gateway locally, it chooses action 1. Otherwise, it chooses action 2, which results in the basic algorithm being replayed, with the attacker's gateway taking the role of the attacker. This is illustrated in figure 1. way asks from router R1 to block all traffic from attacker A to victim V . In round 2, the victim's gateway asks from router R2 to block all traffic from router R1 to the victim V .
We repeat that our minimal anti-spoofing requirement enables only choice 1, because contacting a second border router close to the attacker requires that the victim (or its gateway) have more information on the attack path.
AITF Parameter Values
Temporary Filter Timeout
The goal of the temporary filter on the victim's gateway is to block attack traffic until the 3-way handshake is complete. Considering that Internet round-trip times range from 50 to 200 msec, a safe value for T tmp is 1 sec.
Filtering Window
A positive aspect of AITF is that the administrator of an attack source immediately learns that their machine has been compromised and is being used to send undesired traffic -she finds out either by reading the filtering requests sent to the machine or by noticing that the machine has been disconnected. So, the choice of the filtering window T involves the following trade-off: A large T of, say, 30 minutes guarantees that, once a filtering request has been satisfied, the victim will not receive any traffic from the corresponding attack source for at least 30 minutes. However, it also guarantees that the attack source will not send any traffic at all for 30 minutes, even if it gets immediately patched and cleaned by its administrator.
For the rest of the paper, we use example values of T = 2 or 10 min -although our performance estimates are always presented as functions of T . We realize that it is debatable whether 2 or even 10 minutes are enough for an administrator to read a filtering request and patch their system. We use these example values only to illustrate our performance estimates with specific numbers, and leave the optimal T value as an open question.
Performance Estimates
We use the following metrics to evaluate AITF:
• The filtering response time with respect to an undesired flow F is the amount of time that elapses from the moment the victim sends the first AITF message with flow label F until F is blocked.
• The lost victim bandwidth is the fraction of the victim's bandwidth that gets consumed by undesired flows. The preserved victim bandwidth is the fraction of the victim's bandwidth that remains available to legitimate flows.
• The filtering resources include the number of filters (the amount of TCAM memory) and the number of shadow entries (the amount of DRAM memory) required by the AITF algorithm.
Victim's per Flow Perspective: Filtering Response Time
In the common case, filtering response time for undesired flow F equals the one-way delay D from the victim to its gateway, which is typically a few milliseconds. Spikes can still occur after D, if the attacker or the attacker's gateway play the on-off game described in section 3.3.4. A router that plays this game would necessarily have to be controlled by the attacker. Each such compromised router along the attack path induces two spikes, spaced out by T tmp time units, because each router is given two chances to have the undesired flow blocked. The effect of these spikes on the victim is insignificant, as we demonstrate in our simulation results.
Victim's Aggregate Perspective: Preserved Victim Bandwidth
One filtering request causes an undesired flow to be blocked for T time units, where T is the filtering window. Thus, a victim allowed to send up to R filtering requests per time unit can have R · T simultaneous undesired flows blocked. It follows that, the lost victim bandwidth is equal to the bandwidth B att of all the undesired flows N att minus the bandwidth of the R · T undesired flows that get blocked. The preserved victim bandwidth B p is equal to the total victim bandwidth B v minus the lost victim bandwidth:
For example, consider a victim site that connects to the Internet through a 100 Mbps link, and a 100 Mbps attack coming from 1M attack sources. Without AITF, this attack would completely consume the victim's bandwidth. For R = 1K filtering requests per second and T = 10 minutes, the victim preserves 60 Mbps of its bandwidth. For R = 2K filtering requests per second and the same T , the victim preserves almost 100% of its bandwidth.
A proof for the above formula can be found in the appendix.
Router's Perspective: Filtering Resources
Consider AITF router Gw, which connects edge-network N et to its ISP provider. Gw needs filters to run both the attacker's gateway algorithm -i.e., block undesired traffic sent by N et hosts -and the victim's gateway algorithmi.e., block undesired traffic sent to N et hosts. The attacker's gateway algorithm spends a filter on each attacker only temporarily. Beyond that, either the attacker stops or has its port disabled. Thus, Gw needs a number of filters proportional to the number of connected hosts.
The victim's gateway algorithm initially spends one filter per filtering request for only T tmp time units. Therefore, in order to satisfy R max filtering requests per time unit, Gw needs at least R max · T tmp filters. In the bestcase scenario, all of the attacker gateways cooperate, and Gw does not spend any more filters. In the worst-case scenario, none of the attacker gateways respond, and Gw ends up filtering traffic from all of them. The total number of filters required by the victim's gateway algorithm is bounded by these two cases:
where R max is the max rate of satisfiable filtering requests, and N agw is the number of attacker gateways.
For example, consider that one of Gw's clients is receiving 1M undesired flows forwarded by N agw = 160K 1 attacker gateways. To preserve all its bandwidth, the victim needs to send R = 2K filtering requests/sec (see section 4.2). Thus, if all attacker gateways cooperate, Gw must use 2K filters to preserve 100% of its client's bandwidth. If nobody cooperates, Gw must use 160K filters to have the same effect.
Apart from wire-speed filters, the AITF algorithm also requires DRAM for the shadow filtering table. Each received filtering request is stored in DRAM for T time units. Thus, a router needs R max ·T DRAM entries, where R max is the maximum rate of filtering requests that can be satisfied. Note that DRAM is not the limiting factor: Even if a network were attacked by 10M attack sources at the same time, a few gigabytes of DRAM would be enough for the shadow table.
Internet Deployment
AITF Domains
Rather than requiring every Internet router to support AITF, it is sufficient for the border routers between administrative domains to support it. We introduce the notion of an AITF domain as an administrative domain whose border routers are AITF routers.
An AITF domain has a filtering contract with each local end-host and peering domain. Such a contract specifies a maximum filtering request rate, i.e., the maximum rate at which the AITF domain can send/receive requests to block undesired flows to/from each end-host and peering domain. An AITF domain enforces the specified rates and indiscriminately drops messages from an end-host/domain when that end-host/domain exceeds the agreed rate.
In a way, an AITF domain is the "dual" of a BGP Autonomous System (AS): ASs exchange routing information, which communicates their willingness to relay certain packets. Similarly, AITF domains exchange filtering information, which communicates their unwillingness to receive certain packets. However, an AITF domain differs from an AS, in that it exchanges messages with other AITF domains that are not adjacent to it -recall that the victim's gateway talks directly to the attacker's gateway. It seems natural for every Autonomous System (i.e., every ISP, national network and international backbone), to map to a separate AITF domain.
Our position is that the filtering contract should be part of the Service Level Agreement (SLA) signed between the customer and the service provider. In this way, when a domain agrees to provide a certain amount of bandwidth 1 160K is the total number of network prefixes currently advertised in the Internet [7] , so this is an upper bound for the number of attacker gateways.
to a customer, the provider also agrees to satisfy a certain rate of filtering requests coming from that customer. At the same time, the customer agrees to satisfy a certain rate of filtering requests coming from the provider. The customer-provider pair can be an end-host and an edgenetwork, or an edge-network and an ISP, or even a small ISP and a backbone network.
Initial Deployment
AITF effectiveness increases with the number of administrative domains that deploy it. For example, in section 4.3 we saw that the victim's gateway can block 1M attack flows using only 2K filters, provided that all the attackerIn this section, we illustrate that this is the case using an example. In figure 2 , only two networks in the entire Internet have deployed AITF: Popular website ebay.com and Stanford University. A worm compromises 1M hosts, distributed among 160K edge-networks, and commands them to launch a DDoS attack against ebay.com (66.135.192.87). 160K is the total number of prefixes currently advertised in the Internet, and, thus, an upper bound for the number of edge-networks hosting attack sources [7] . Therefore, an attack coming from 160K edge-networks is an attack coming from the entire Internet.
The victim's gateway identifies the 160K edge-routers that forward attack traffic and requests that they block their misbehaving clients. Only Stanford's edge-router R 1 cooperates; R 2 to R 160K keep forwarding attack traffic. As a result, the mechanism escalates and the victim's gateway uses 159, 999 filters to locally block all traffic coming from all edge-networks but Stanford.
When the AITF mechanism completes, the only edgenetwork that has preserved its connectivity to ebay.com is Stanford, and attack traffic has been eliminated. Of course, by blocking entire edge-networks, ebay.com also blocks the good traffic coming from them. However, the alternative is to let attack traffic through, which would result in most good traffic being dropped because of congestion. So, ebay.com benefits from AITF, because it preserves a fraction of its good traffic -even if it is just the good traffic coming from Stanford. On the other hand, Stanford clearly benefits from AITF, because it is the only edge-network to preserve its connectivity to the popular website during the attack.
To summarize, there may be millions of attack sources, but there are only thousands of edge-networks to host them. A router cannot accommodate millions of filters, but it does accommodate thousands. So, the gateway of a DDoS victim may be unable to block each attack source individually, but it is able to block each edge-network individually. However, blocking an entire edge-network results in blocking both attack and good traffic coming from it. To avoid this, the edge-network can take responsibility, block its misbehaving clients itself, and preserve its connectivity to the victim.
Deployment beyond the Edges
We have illustrated that a minimal AITF deployment at the edges of the Internet enables the gateway of a DDoS victim to block attack traffic within a single escalation round. In this section, we discuss large-scale attacks that require wider deployment. In figure 3 , AITF has been deployed throughout the Internet. A worm compromises 1M hosts, distributed among 100K edge-networks, and commands them to launch DDoS attacks against 100 N et clients. At the same time, the worm compromises the attacker gateways, so that they do not respond to AITF messages.
The victim gateway contacts edge routers R 1 to R 100K and requests from each one to block its misbehaving clients. None of them responds, prompting an escalation. In the second round, the victim gateway contacts border routers B 1 to B 100 and requests each one to block all traffic from its attacker gateways to the victims. Each border router agrees to cooperate and sends appropriate filtering requests to its attacker gateways. The attacker gateways either stop forwarding traffic to the victims or get disconnected.
In this scenario, it is impossible for N et's gateway to locally block all traffic from each attacker gateway to each victim -it would need 100 · 100, 000 = 10M filters. Therefore, N et's gateway requests help from border routers located close to the attack sources. This requires (i) that these border routers have deployed AITF, and (ii) that N et's gateway can inspect a packet and identify, with high probability, and at wire-speed, the border routers that forwarded the packet -which is more than our minimal requirement.
To summarize, our minimal anti-spoofing requirement and a minimal AITF deployment at the edges of the Internet enable a network gateway to block a large-scale attack against a few victims. However, to block multiple large-scale attacks that potentially involve compromised routers, a network gateway needs (i) wider deployment range that includes more than one border router along the attack path, and (ii) more information on the attack path, i.e., the sequence of border routers that compose it.
The next generation Internet architecture presented in [12] , provides such complete path information. Also, the Pi mechanism provides each packet with an identifier that depends on the entire path followed by the packet [17] . Therefore, we believe that it could be adequately modified to provide the required path information. Finally, even if there is no existing solution that provides the required path information, we believe that AITF illustrates how useful this information can be in fighting next-generation DDoS attacks, and can motivate further research in this direction.
Simulation Results
We built our simulator within the Dartmouth Scalable Simulation Framework (DaSSF) [3] . To create our topology, we downloaded Internet routing table data from the Route Views project site [8] . We processed this data using Gao's algorithm for inferring Autonomous System (AS) relationships [13] .
In our simulator, we map each AS and each edgenetwork to a separate AITF domain. We derive AS topology and peering relationships by applying Gao's algorithm to the Route Views data. We derive edge-network topology by roughly creating one edge-network per advertised class A and class B prefix. 2 We obtained our routing table data on February 11, 2004 ; it yielded 64, 608 AITF domains. Each AITF domain is represented by one AITF router. 4 AITF routers are interconnected through OC192 (10 Gbps) or OC48 (2.488 Gbps) links. End-hosts are connected to their routers through Fast (100 Mbps) or Thin (10 Mbps) Ethernet links. Internet round-trip times average 200 msec. Host-to-router round-trip times average 20 msec.
All our simulation scenarios have the following characteristics:
• There is 1 AITF router acting as the victim's gateway to 10 DDoS victims.
• Before the attack, each victim is receiving 50 Mbps of goodput.
• Each victim takes 1 sec to react to the attack, and 100 msec to detect a recurring flow, already identified and blocked in the past.
5 4 This leads to worst-case simulation scenarios, because all AITF messages sent to a domain are handled by a single router with its limited filtering resources. 5 These times are arbitrarily chosen and do not depend on nor affect AITF operation.
• Each victim is allowed to send up to 1K filtering requests/sec to its gateway.
• Temporary filter timeout is T tmp = 1 sec and the filtering window is T = 2 min.
• Attack bandwidths range from 100 Mbps to 1 Gbps per victim.
• The number of attackers ranges from 1K to 300K per victim, i.e., 10K to 3M overall.
Scenario 1: Each victim is sent 1 Gbps of attack traffic, evenly generated by 1K attackers. The attackers are evenly distributed behind 1K attacker gateways. All attacker gateways cooperate. Result: As shown in figure 4 on the left, each victim's goodput is restored within 10 msec. The victim's gateway uses overall 10K filters for 1 sec. Graph description: Before the attack, the victim's goodput is 50 Mbps; the attack starts at t = 1 sec and drives the victim's goodput to 0; the victim reacts at t = 2 sec by sending 1K filtering requests to its gateway; the victim's gateway responds within 10 msec by blocking the 1K undesired flows.
Scenario 2: Each victim is sent 1 Gbps of attack traffic, evenly generated by 1K attackers. The attackers are evenly distributed behind 1K attacker gateways. All attacker gateways are compromised and are playing the onoff game described in 3.3.4.
Result: As shown in figure 4 on the right, most of each victim's goodput is restored within 10 msec, with the exception of two 100 msec spikes. Some goodput is lost because of escalation. The victim's gateway uses overall 10K filters for 2 min. Graph description: The victim's goodput is driven to 0 when the attack starts, and restored at t = 2.01 when the victim's gateway blocks the undesired flows. Then, the on-off game starts: The attacker gateways pause forwarding attack traffic at t = 2.3, when the victim's gateway completes the 3-way handshakes; they resume forwarding attack traffic at t = 3.01, when the victim's gateway removes the temporary filters. The victim receives the second attack wave at t = 3.11, and reacts at t = 3.21, by sending a second wave of filtering requests. This sequence of events is "replayed" once more -recall that each attacker gateway is given two chances -before the victim's gateway determines that the attacker gateways are compromised and blocks their traffic locally. Note that the victim's goodput is not restored 100%, because some of the good traffic gets lost when the mechanism escalates.
Scenario 3: Each victim is sent 1 Gbps of attack traffic, evenly generated by 5K attackers. All attacker gateways cooperate and block attack traffic. The attackers pause sending undesired traffic when so requested to avoid disconnection; they resume as soon as the filtering window expires. Note that the number of undesired flows per victim (N att = 5K) is higher than the maximum per victim filtering request rate (R = 1K). Result: As shown in figure 5 , each victim's goodput is restored within 5 sec. The victim's gateway uses 10K filters for 5 sec every 2 min.
Graph description:
The victim reacts at t = 2 sec by sending 1K filtering requests/sec to its gateway. The victim's goodput is completely restored at t = 7 sec, when all 5K undesired flows are pushed to their gateways.
Scenario 4:
Each victim is sent 100 Mbps of attack traffic, evenly generated by 300K attackers. All attacker gateways cooperate and block attack traffic. The attackers pause sending undesired traffic when so requested, in order to avoid disconnection; they resume as soon as the filtering window expires. Note that, for each victim, the number of undesired flows (N att = 300K) is higher than the number of flows that can be blocked within the filtering window (R · T = 120K). Result: As shown in figure 6 , 40% of each victim's bandwidth is restored within 2 min. The victim's gateway uses 10K filters at all time.
Graph description:
The victim reacts at t = 2 sec, by sending 1K filtering requests/sec to its gateway; the attackers start resuming their undesired flows at T = 2 min, when requests start expiring; from that point on, for each 1K undesired flows blocked, another 1K are released; hence, the lost victim bandwidth remains constant. 
Discussion and Future Work
Automatic Disconnection is Dangerous
AITF involves a rather Draconian measure against attack sources: Either they stop sending undesired traffic or they get disconnected. This can be abused by malicious node M to disconnect legacy host L that does not understand AITF messages:
1. M sends out a filtering request to block all traffic from L to M .
2. The request reaches L's gateway, which propagates it to L and installs an appropriate filter to verify that L obeys.
3. M tricks L into sending it some traffic -e.g., if L is a web server, M makes an http request to it.
4. L's gateway catches the traffic from L to M and disconnects L.
To avoid this abuse, any administrative domain that deploys AITF must either (i) force its clients to deploy AITF as well, or (ii) accept the burden of filtering the undesired traffic they forward -e.g., in the last example, L's gateway does not disconnect L, but installs a filter that blocks all traffic from L to M for T time units. The second option is less aggressive and more incrementally deployable, but it disables use of temporary filters and the shadow filtering table in the attacker's gateway algorithm. As a result, it requires more filtering resources from each participating gateway, namely, as many filters as undesired flows generated by the gateway's clients. As a compromise, a service provider could charge legacy clients that do not support AITF, for the potential filtering load induced by their inability to block their undesired traffic themselves.
Compromised Routers
The 3-way handshake enables a compromised router cGw, which is located on the path between routers vGw and aGw, to interrupt their communication:
1. cGw spoofs the IP address of vGw and uses it to send to aGw a SYN packet with a filtering request to block all its traffic to vGw.
2. aGw responds with a SYN/ACK.
3. cGw intercepts the SYN/ACK and completes the handshake.
aGw blocks all its traffic to vGw.
On the other hand, a compromised router on the path between two victim nodes can disrupt the victims' communication anyway, with or without AITF, e.g. by dropping all their traffic. Of course, AITF does offer a compromised router yet another way to damage transit traffic. Nevertheless, the 3-way handshake is necessary for scalability, because it enables edge-routers to directly establish filtering agreements, bypassing the Internet core.
Forged Requests
As described so far, AITF can be abused by malicious node M to interrupt the communications of node N that is located on the same subnet with M , i.e., to harm the connectivity of its own subnet:
1. M spoofs the IP address of N and sends a filtering request to block certain traffic addressed to N .
2. M 's gateway cannot verify that the filtering request is spoofed and completes the appropriate 3-way handshakes.
3. N looses part (or all) of its communications.
To avoid this abuse, any administrative domain that deploys AITF must either (i) prevent source address spoofing in its own network or (ii) authenticate victim filtering requests -i.e., requests coming from its own clients.
DDoS against AITF
The only part of the AITF mechanism that is susceptible to a DDoS attack is the attacker's gateway algorithm, because it is the only one to accept requests from unknown sources. A router running the victim's gateway algorithm only accepts rate-limited requests from its own customers. Similarly, an end-host/router suspected of being an attacker, only accepts rate-limited requests from its own providers -a correctly functioning provider would not overload a customer with filtering requests and then disconnect the customer for failing to satisfy them. The attacker's gateway algorithm is susceptible to the following attack: If AITF router Gw is flooded with AITF messages sent by alleged victim gateways, it spends all its resources trying to process them and fails to satisfy the "real" ones. Note that, in order for this to be a problem, there must be "real" AITF messages, i.e., there must be Gw clients actually sending undesired flows. Therefore, in order to launch such an attack on Gw, an attacker must compromise (i) enough Internet hosts to flood Gw with bogus filtering requests and (ii) enough Gw clients to actually start an attack behind Gw. Such a powerful attacker can indeed affect Gw's ability to execute the attacker's gateway algorithm.
Gw can take two steps to mitigate such an attack: (i) Avoid local buffering of SYN messages corresponding to uncompleted handshakes. Instead, use the SYN cookie technique [5] employed by TCP to prevent SYN flooding attacks. (ii) Inspect the received AITF messages and identify the AITF routers that forward an excess of messages and filter/rate-limit them (recall that, according to our minimal anti-spoofing requirement, a node can inspect a packet and identify, with high probability, and at wire-speed, a border router that forwarded the packet and is located close to its source). Ultimately, if the misbehaving AITF routers are too many to filter locally, Gw can act as a DDoS victim and use itself AITF to push filtering of undesired traffic close to its sources. However, we have not yet studied nor simulated any scenario where an AITF router acts as a victim.
Dynamic Allocation of Filtering Resources
An AITF provider does not have to statically preallocate a fixed number of filters to every client. When there are enough filters, there is no reason to deny satisfying a filtering request, even when the corresponding client has exceeded its maximum rate. In the same way, when the provider is running out of filters, it can dynamically communicate to the clients to lower their filtering request rates.
Related Work
Having briefly introduced the Pushback mechanism in section 1, we now make a more detailed comparison to AITF. Pushback assumes no anti-spoofing mechanism and, thus, defines an attack flow only in terms of its IP destination prefix. For example, if end-host V is under attack, V 's edge-router identifies the link that contributes most to the attack and blocks (or rate-limits) all traffic arriving on that link and addressed to V . As a result, Pushback (i) is directly deployable in the current Internet, and (ii) requires from each router only 1 filter per victim. On the other hand, if attack traffic is uniformly distributed across the inbound links, a pushback router ends up sacrificing all (or most) good traffic to the victim -an effect characterized in [14] as collateral damage. As a result, Pushback is not effective when the attack sources are evenly distributed across the Internet.
Pushback propagates filtering requests hop-by-hop through the network. As a result, Pushback does not need to verify the authenticity of filtering requests. On the other hand, hop-by-hop propagation of filtering requests places a large load on the core of the Internet, turning it into a potential "filtering bottleneck". The current Pushback design avoids this problem by filtering based on the IP destination prefix -which requires only 1 filter per victim. However, this limits Pushback's ability to selectively block attack traffic and eliminate collateral damage, even in presence of an anti-spoofing mechanism. We believe that source address spoofing is a serious enough problem to motivate the deployment of an Internet-wide anti-spoofing mechanism. AITF was designed to leverage such a mechanism to avoid collateral damage and block large numbers of concurrent attack flows as close as possible to their sources.
Another mechanism for mitigating DDoS attacks is the Stateless Internet Flow Filter (SIFF) [11] . In this scheme, all Internet traffic is divided into two categories: Privileged and non-privileged. Privileged traffic always receives priority over non-privileged traffic. A client establishes a privileged channel to a server through a capability exchange handshake that involves packet marking by all the routers on the path; the client includes the capability in each packet it sends to the server; each router along the path verifies the capability and gives priority to the client's traffic. The main advantages of SIFF are that (i) it does not require any filtering state in the routers, and (ii) it does not assume any cooperation between ISPs. On the other hand, it requires deployment in all the routers on the client-to-server path that control bottleneck links. Also, once a server is under attack, a new client must try multiple times (the exact number depends on the strength of the attack) to establish a privileged channel, because channel establishment unavoidably involves an exchange of two non-privileged packets. Finally, it is possible for malicious nodes to establish privileged connections between them and flood the network with privileged traffic -though it should be noted that this attack requires cooperating attacker pairs.
Lakshminarayanan et al. have proposed using the Internet Indirection Infrastructure (I3) to enable a victim to stop certain types of traffic by removing the corresponding I3 identifier from the network [10] . This mechanism can be used to block traffic addressed to unutilized ports, contain the traffic of individual applications, or prioritize the traffic of already established connections. It does not address the issue of blocking a large number of undesired flows using a reasonable number of filters per router.
Conclusions
We presented AITF, a mechanism that protects publicaccess sites against highly distributed denial-of-service attacks. Its main advantages are that (i) it blocks large numbers of attack flows, while requiring from each participating router only a reasonable number of filters, and (ii) it is incrementally deployable.
More specifically, if AITF is widely deployed, an AITF router with 10K filters can mitigate an attack coming from 3M sources uniformly distributed across the Internet, by restoring 40% of the victim's bandwidth within 2 minutes. If none of the edge-networks hosting attack sources has deployed AITF, the victim's gateway still achieves the same result, but needs up to 160K filters (as many as all the Internet edge-networks). If an attack source is located in an edge-network that has not deployed AITF, blocking its traffic comes at the cost of blocking all traffic from the specific edge-network to the victim. Only the edgenetworks that have deployed AITF preserve their connectivity to the victim.
The simple idea behind AITF is that the Internet does have enough filtering capacity to block large amounts of undesired traffic -it is just that this capacity is concentrated close to the undesired traffic sources. AITF enables service providers to "gain access" to this filtering capacity and couple it with a reasonable amount of their own filtering resources, in order to protect their customers in the face of increasingly distributed denial-of-service attacks.
